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THE JURISPRUDENTIAL REVOLUTION: UNLOCKING HUMAN
POTENTIAL IN GRUTTER AND LAWRENCE
Wilson Huhn*
INTRODUCTION
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas' and Grutter v.
Bollinger,2 stripped to their bare holdings, have little immediate effect on existing
law. After Grutter, colleges and graduate schools will continue to take race into
account in admitting students to enroll a diverse student body, just as they have
done for the past quarter century in conformity with Justice Lewis Powell's opinion
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.3 After Lawrence, laws against
gay sex may no longer be enforced, but only a handful of states still had these laws
on the books at the time of the decision, and enforcement of those laws was
practically nonexistent.4
However, the opinions of the Supreme Court in both Lawrence and Grutter
work fundamental changes in the interpretation of our fundamental rights of liberty
and equality. These legal changes both confirm and anticipate far-reaching changes
in our society by recognizing certain aspects of human potential. This article
* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr.,
Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Constitutional Law Center, University of Akron
School of Law. I wish to thank Dean Richard Aynes and Professor Jane Moriarty of the
University of Akron School of Law for their encouragement and valuable suggestions.
' 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute making homosexual conduct a
crime).
2 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding a race-based affirmative action program for
admission to law school).
3 438 U.S. 265, 269-324 (1978) (striking down racial quota in admissions program to
medical school, but upholding racial preferences in admissions to enhance diversity).
4 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481. The Court found:
The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the
Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only
against homosexual conduct. In those States where sodomy is still proscribed,
whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private. The State of
Texas admitted in 1994 that as of that date it had not prosecuted anyone under
those circumstances.
Id. (citing State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941,943 (1994)); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 197-98 & n.2 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The history of nonenforcement
suggests the moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type of private, consensual
conduct.").
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describes the jurisprudential revolution that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor led in
Lawrence and Grutter.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in the Lawrence case makes the following changes
in the interpretation of the Due Process Clause:
1. The Right to Privacy is not defined by reference to specific American
traditions, but rather by reference to society's "emerging awareness" of the
effect of laws on people's private lives.5
2. The Right to Privacy includes "certain intimate conduct" not because the
sexual act itself usually occurs in private, but because of the central
importance of sexual relationships in people's lives.6
3. The Court will look to legal developments in other nations, in particular
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in defining our
fundamental rights.7
4. Morality, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis for prohibitory legislation.
Instead, the state must explain how behavior is harmful before it can make
it unlawful.8
Justice O'Connor's opinion in the Grutter case, as well as her concurring
opinion and Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence, make or confirm the
following changes in the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause:
1. The level of scrutiny that the Court applies in evaluating the constitutionality
of laws under the Equal Protection Clause varies with the context. Neither
strict scrutiny nor rational basis is applied the same in all cases.'
2. Laws that intentionally stigmatize groups are scrutinized more strictly than
laws that do not.'o
3. Laws that inhibit people's personal relationships are scrutinized more strictly
than laws that do not."
4. Moral disapproval of a group or its actions standing alone is not a sufficient
reason for legislation that discriminates against the group.'2
5. Race-based affirmative action in university admissions is constitutional
because it is necessary to train leaders from all segments of society. 3
Taken collectively, these developments represent a revolutionary shift in the
interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. In both cases the Supreme
Court embraced consequentialist reasoning, meaning that the Court focused on the
5 See discussion infra Part I.A.
6 See discussion infra Part I.B.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
8 See discussion infra Part I.D.
9 See discussion infra Part II.A.
10 See discussion infra Part Il.B.
," See discussion infra Part II.C.
12 See discussion infra Part II.D.
13 See discussion infra Part II.E.
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effect that its decisions would have on society and on the lives of individuals. 4 In
Lawrence, the Court was primarily concerned with the stigmatizing effect of the
Texas statute on gays and lesbians.' 5 The Court held that homosexuals must be
treated with dignity and respect, and therefore, a law that brands all homosexuals
as criminals is unconstitutional. 6 In Grutter, the Court was strongly influenced by
amicus briefs that predicted a number of deleterious social consequences that would
follow from outlawing affirmative action in education. 7 The Court upheld
affirmative action in university admissions because our Nation has a compelling
interest in training leaders from all segments of our society.'
Both cases turn upon fundamental beliefs about human potential. Lawrence is
based upon the belief that homosexual relationships are valuable and are entitled to
respect.' 9 Grutter is based upon the belief that members of racial and ethnic
minorities are not only capable of playing leadership roles, but that it is critical for
the future of our Nation that our leaders be drawn from every race and every ethnic
group.20 The conclusions that the Court draws about human potential in Lawrence
and Grutter are not determined by the myths of our ancestors, but rather arise from
a careful and sensitive analysis of how people lead their lives. This approach to
interpreting the Constitution promises to achieve a more universal understanding
of liberty and equality and a more comprehensive embodiment of the principles
expressed in the Declaration of Independence.2'
Part I of this article describes the changes in the interpretation of our
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause that are contained in Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence. Part II describes how the interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause is changed by Justice O'Connor's opinions in Grutter and
Lawrence. The Conclusion explains the underlying jurisprudential shift that these
changes represent.
14 Cf STEPHEN E. GorrIEB, MORALITYIMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND LIBERTY
IN AMERICA 57, 97 (2000) (criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to adopt a
consequentialist approach to interpreting the Constitution); WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES
OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 53-63 (2002) (describing the history of consequentialist analysis in
American jurisprudence).
"5 See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003).
16 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
17 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2340-41 (2003).
18 See id. at 2341, 2362-63.
19 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
20 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341 ("[I]t is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.").
21 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 ("As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.").
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I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL REVOLUTION IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY
A. The right to privacy is not defined by reference to specific American traditions,
but rather by reference to society's "emerging awareness" of the effect of laws on
people's private lives.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas overrules its previous
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.22 However, the jurisprudential revolution wrought
by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence is best understood against the backdrop of Roe v.
Wade.
23
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the majority of the Court in Roe relied heavily
on consequentialist analysis. 24 The heart of his opinion is the following passage,
in which he describes the effects of unwanted pregnancy and childbirth on women' s
lives:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm
medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there
is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved.
22 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986))
(upholding Georgia statute making "sodomy" a crime as applied to homosexuals).
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down aTexas law prohibiting abortions based upon Due
Process Clause analysis).
24 Id. at 153.
25 Id. (describing the consequences of prohibiting abortion). It was no accident that this
became the focus of Justice Blackmun's opinion. Sarah Weddington, the attorney for Roe,
had made this theme the central point of her oral argument before the Supreme Court. See
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955 344-45 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993). Here is
how she opened her argument in that historic case:
In Texas, the woman is the victim. The state cannot deny the effects that this law
has on the women of Texas. Certainly there are problems regarding even the use
of contraception. Abortion now for a woman is safer than childbirth. In the
absence of abortion, or legal, medically safe abortions, women often result [sic]
to the illegal abortion, which certainly carry [sic] risks of death, all the side
[Vol. 12:65
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Justice Scalia has led the jurisprudential fight against Roe, and in 1989 he threw
down the gauntlet in his famous "footnote 6" in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,26 saying
that "tradition" is the only legitimate source of our unenumerated rights. 2' That case
involved the question whether a man, who had conceived a child with a woman
married to another man, had the constitutional right to be legally considered the
"father" of the child, despite a state law which did not allow him to challenge the
presumption that the husband of the woman was the father.28 Justice Scalia
declared that the Constitution did not encompass this right because the specific
tradition in America was that the law considered the husband and not the biological
father to be the father of a child who was conceived and born during the marriage.29
Decrying the indeterminacy of appeals to general traditions such as "parenthood,"3
effects such as severe infection, permanent sterility, all the complications that
result. And in fact, if the woman is unable to get either a legal abortion or an
illegal abortion in our state, she can do a self-abortion, which is certainly,
perhaps, by far the most dangerous. And that is no crime....
If the pregnancy would result in the birth of a deformed or defective child, she
has no relief. Regardless of the circumstances of conception, whether it was
because of rape, incest, whether she is extremely immature, she has no relief....
I think it's without question that pregnancy to a woman can completely disrupt
her life. It disrupts her body, it disrupts her education, it disrupts her
employment, and it often disrupts her entire family life. And we feel that because
of the impact on the woman, this certainly, inasfar [sic] as there are any rights
which are fundamental, is a matter which is of such fundamental and basic
concern to the woman involved that she should be allowed to make the choice
as to whether to continue or to terminate her pregnancy.
Id.
26 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding a California statute which denied a biological father's
right to establish paternity of child conceived with a married woman).
27 See id. at 127-28 n.6 ("[A] rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular,
identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.").
28 See id. at 113 (describing Section 621 of the California Evidence Code as providing
that "a child born to a married woman living with her husband is presumed to be a child of
the marriage" and that "[t]he presumption of legitimacy may be rebutted only by the husband
or wife, and then only in limited circumstances") (CAL. EviD. CODE §621 (West Supp.
1989)).
29 See id. at 124-27 (describing the history of the common law presumption of
legitimacy).
30 Justice Scalia stated:
We do not understand why, having rejected our focus upon the societal tradition
regarding the natural father's rights vis-A-vis a child whose mother is married to
another man, Justice Brennan would choose to focus instead upon "parenthood."
Why should the relevant category not be even more general - perhaps "family
relationships"; or "personal relationships"; or even "emotional attachments in
general"? ... The need, if arbitrary decision making is to be avoided, to adopt
the most specific tradition as the point of reference - or at least to announce,
2003]
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Justice Scalia stated that "a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any
particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all."'" Because unenumerated
rights such as the "right to privacy" by definition are not determined by reference
to text, under Justice Scalia's formula, the only source of unenumerated rights is
tradition itself.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in the opinion of the
majority in Michael H. except for footnote 6. The concurring opinion is four
sentences long:
I concur in all but footnote 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion. This footnote
sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty
interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions
in this area. On occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions
protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be "the
most specific level" available. I would not foreclose the unanticipated
by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis. 2
Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy thus placed themselves squarely in the
center of the jurisprudential divide between those who believe that our
constitutional "liberty" is limited to conduct that our ancestors engaged in without
interference from the state, and those who believe that "liberty" is an evolving
concept that encompasses more than traditional modes of behavior. In 1992, in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,33 these two justices
signaled their choice.
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Casey, many people predicted
that the Court, now dominated by Reagan and Bush appointees, would overrule Roe
v. Wade.' But the Court, led by three of those appointees, confounded
as Justice Brennan declines to do, some other criterion for selecting among the
innumerable relevant traditions that could be consulted - is well enough
exemplified by the fact that in the present case Justice Brennan's opinion and
Justice O'Connor's opinion . ..which disapproves this footnote, both appeal to
tradition, but on the basis of the tradition they select reach opposite results.
Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving judges free to
decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a rule of law that binds
neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.
Id. at 127-28 n.6 (arguing that unenumerated rights ought to be defined by reference to
tradition at the most specific level of generality) (citation omitted).
"' Id. at 128 n.6.
32 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
33 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe, but also upholding certain restrictions on
abortion).
' See, e.g., Robert Whereatt, Roe Lawyer Thinks Court Will Overturn Law in 1993,
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expectations.3 5 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souterjointly authored a plurality
opinion in which they reaffirmed Roe.36 Their opinion expressed two reasons for
the decision. First, they argued that the principle of stare decisis militated in favor
of following Roe. 7 But the other portion of their opinion - the part that until now
has drawn relatively less attention - acknowledged that people have a fundamental
right to make certain "intimate and personal choices. '38 At a critical passage in the
opinion, the plurality stated:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.39
Five years later, in 1997, Justice Scalia's effort to define the right to privacy
solely by reference to "tradition" received support in Washington v. Glucksberg,
where the Court unanimously declared that a Washington statute prohibiting
assisted suicide was constitutional on its face.' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for himself and four other members of the Court, based his decision on the ground
that assisted suicide is not deeply rooted in American traditions.4' However, the
STAR-TRIBtJNE (MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL), May 21, 1992, at 4B (quoting Sarah Weddington,
attorney for Roe, predicting that Supreme Court would overrule Roe); see also James Bopp,
Jr., Richard E. Coleson & Barry A. Bostrom, Does the United States Supreme Court Have
a Constitutional Duty to Expressly Reconsider and Overrule Roe v. Wade?, 1 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 55,57 (1990) ("[T]he Court has sub silentio overruled Roe."); Kathleen Sullivan,
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 24 (1992) ("If asked what a
conservative Supreme Court would do with five seats and a clear chance, the person on the
street would have predicted that it would gut the abortion right. .. ").
" See Sullivan, supra note 34, at 24-25 ("In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court
spectacularly failed to overrule Roe v. Wade.").
36 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 843-911 (plurality opinion).
" See id. at 854-69 (applying doctrine of stare decisis in reaffining Roe).
38 Id. at 851.
39 Id.
- 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (upholding state statute banning physician assisted-suicide against
facial attack).
4' See id. at 728.
The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and
continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being
the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted "right" to assistance
in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.
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authoritativeness of the reasoning of the majority opinion implicitly identifying
"tradition" as the sole source of unenumerated rights was undercut by the
concurring opinions of the other justices. Justice Souter and Justice Stevens,
concurring separately, expressly invoked the standard announced in the plurality
opinion in Casey and rejected the majority's exclusive reliance on "tradition" in
determining whether the law infringed upon fundamental rights.42 Furthermore,
Justice O'Connor, who joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court,
nevertheless wrote a brief, separate concurring opinion in which she declared that
it was unnecessary for the Court to consider whether "a mentally competent person
who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in
controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death."43 Justice Ginsberg and
Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor on this point.' These concurring opinions
Id. The Chief Justice extensively described the history of laws against suicide and assisted
suicide and used the word "tradition" seventeen times in the course of his opinion for the
Court. See id. at 710-19 & 721-27.
42 See id. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter stated: "My understanding of
unenumerated rights in the wake of the Poe dissent and subsequent cases avoids the absolutist
failing of many older cases without embracing the opposite pole of equating reasonableness
with past practice described at a very specific level." Id. (referring to Casey, 505 U.S. at
847-49; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); and Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 745 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). "Avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living one's final days
incapacitated and in agony is certainly '[a]t the heart of [the] liberty... to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."'
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 745 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
4 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated:
I join the Court's opinions because I agree that there is no generalized right to
"commit suicide." But respondents urge us to address the narrower question
whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a
constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her
imminent death. I see no need to reach that question in the context of the facial
challenges to the New York and Washington laws at issue here.... The parties
and amici agree that in these States a patient who is suffering from a terminal
illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining
medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the
point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.
Id. at 736-37.
4 See id. at 789 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) ("I concur in the Court's judgments in these
cases substantially for the reasons stated by Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion.... ") (citation omitted); id. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated:
Were the legal circumstances different - for example, were state law to prevent
the provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as needed
to avoid pain at the end of life - then the law's impact upon serious and
otherwise unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death) would be more
directly at issue. And as Justice O'Connor suggests, the Court might have to
revisit its conclusions in these cases.
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deprived the Chief Justice of a majority on the question of how the fundamental
right ought to be defined.
Accordingly, prior to Lawrence, one wing of the Supreme Court believed that
the "right to privacy" is circumscribed by tradition, while the other recognized a
general right to make "personal and intimate choices" that are "central to personal
dignity and autonomy."" In Lawrence, the Supreme Court made a definitive choice
between these opposing viewpoints.
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy invoked the foregoing passage from the plurality
opinion in Casey46 in support of the conclusion that the right to privacy
encompasses the right of people to engage in homosexual conduct:
The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the
autonomy of the person in making these choices, we stated as follows:
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers
would deny them this right.4 7
Like the decision of the Court in the Michael H. case, the Court's decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick rested mainly on "tradition." In the opinion for the majority
of the Bowers Court, Justice White stated, "[piroscriptions against that conduct
have ancient roots."4 After briefly summarizing the history of laws against sodomy
in America from colonial times to the present, Justice White concluded: "Against
this background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'
is, at best, facetious."49
45 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
46 id.
47 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481-82 (2003) (citations omitted).
48 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
49 Id. at 194.
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Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in Bowers, also relied on
tradition in rejecting a fundamental right to "sodomy":
Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been
subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western
civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards . . . .During the English
Reformation when powers of the ecclesiastical courts were transferred
to the King's Courts, the first English statute criminalizing sodomy was
passed. Blackstone described "the infamous crime against nature" as an
offense of "deeper malignity" than rape, a heinous act "the very mention
of which is a disgrace to human nature," and "a crime not fit to be
named." The common law of England, including its prohibition of
sodomy, became the received law of Georgia and the other Colonies. In
1816 the Georgia Legislature passed the statute at issue here, and that
statute has been continuously in force in one form or another since that
time. To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected
as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral
teaching."0
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy attacked the "tradition" argument in Bowers in
three ways. First, he argued that the Court had misread the historical evidence, and
that legal proscription of homosexual conduct was neither as consistent nor as
universal as Justice White and Chief Justice Burger had described.5 Second, he
noted that while history and tradition are relevant to constitutional interpretation,
standing alone, they are not determinative. 2 Third, he invoked a counterweight to
tradition: the "emerging awareness" of society, in this case society's emerging
awareness of the value of homosexual relationships. 3
Justice Kennedy challenged the finding in Bowers that legal proscription of
homosexual conduct has "ancient roots," 54 stating that the Court should not have
come to a "definitive conclusion"55 on this point. After an extensive review of the
historical evidence,56 Justice Kennedy stated, "laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem
5' Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
51 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80.
52 See id. at 2480.
" See id.
14 Id. at 2479 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192).
11 Id. at 2478.
56 See id. at 2478-80. Justice Kennedy made three arguments disproving the point that
proscription against homosexual behavior had "ancient roots." First, he stated that although
there have long been laws against nonprocreative sex, laws targeting same-sex consenting
adults were not enacted until the last third of the twentieth century. Id. at 2479-80. Second,
[Vol. 12:65
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to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private,"57 and he
concluded, "In summary, the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more
complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice
Burger indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very
least, are overstated.,
58
Concerning the Bowers Court's exclusive reliance on tradition, Justice Kennedy
did not maintain that "tradition" is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation, but he
did rule that, standing alone, tradition is not determinative. Quoting from his own
concurring opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,59 Justice Kennedy stated that
"history and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of
the substantive due process inquiry."6 In other words, tradition is a legitimate
source of constitutional authority, but it is not the only source.6
Justice Kennedy completed his rejection of Justice Scalia's "specific
tradition"62 standard by stating that "we think that our laws and traditions in the past
half century are of most relevance here."63 He cited the recommendations of the
American Law Institute to abolish laws against sodomy in the Model Penal Code,64
actions in Great Britain and Europe to decriminalize homosexual conduct,6 and the
he found that sodomy laws were rarely if ever enforced against consenting adults acting in
private, but rather were enforced in cases involving minors or the use of force. Id. at 2479.
Third, he cited scholarship which "casts some doubt" upon Chief Justice Burger's sweeping
conclusion that "Western civilization" and "Judeo-Christian values" condemned homosexual
conduct and mandated state intervention. Id. at 2480-81.
17 Id. at 2479.
58 Id. at 2480.
" 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (holding that high speed police chases that are not intended to
cause harm do not violate Due Process rights).
0 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
61 See Wilson Huhn, Teaching Legal Analysis Using a Pluralistic Model of Law, 36
GONZ. L. REv. 433,438 (2000-2001) (contrasting "foundational"jurisprudential approaches
with "pluralistic" approaches).
Foundational theories attempt to explain or justify the law in terms of a single
modality or interpretative device. Adherents of foundational theories contend
that the law is legitimately based upon one method of interpretation. The
advantage of such theories is that of increased predictability and determinism.
However, the disadvantage of such theories is they accept only one conception
ofjustice as valid. Pluralistic theories, on the other hand, recognize different, and
often contradictory, conceptions of justice that are reflected in the different
interpretative modalities.
Id.
62 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
63 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2481.
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fact that most American states have repealed their laws against sodomy66 to support
his conclusion that there is "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
,"61pertaining to sex.
The "emerging awareness" standard is based upon language from Justice John
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman.68 Justice Harlan was objecting to the
failure of the Court to agree to review a law forbidding the use of contraceptive
devices.69 In the course of his opinion, Justice Harlan stated that Due Process is the
result of a balance between "respect for the liberty of the individual" and "the
demands of organized society."7 He added, "[t]he balance of which I speak is the
balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
That tradition is a living thing."'"
In both Casey and Michael H., Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor
prominently cited this passage from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe in support of
their understanding of Due Process.72 The "living tradition" from Justice Harlan's
opinion in Poe became the "emerging awareness" in Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Lawrence.
In summary, in Lawrence the majority of the Supreme Court embraced an
expansive definition of the "right to privacy," adopting the passage from the
plurality opinion in Casey that people are free to make "intimate and personal
choices" not because these choices are "traditional" rights, but because these
choices are "central to personal dignity and autonomy." 3 Dissenting in Lawrence,
Justice Scalia refused to acknowledge the importance of the passage from Casey.
Instead, he characterized it as "dictum,"74 belittled it as "the sweet-mystery-of-life
passage,"75 and derided it as "the passage that ate the rule of law. 76 But it has now
66Id.
67 Id. at 2480.
68 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (dismissing case for lack of justiciability because the state's
attorney had not threatened immediate prosecution); id. at 522-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69 See id. at 499 (describing the state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives).
70 Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Four years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), the Court voted to strike down the Connecticut statute forbidding the use of
contraceptives.
72 See Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992) (plurality opinion); Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
14 Id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Id. This is not the first time that Justice Scalia has sarcastically used a hyphenated
phrase to express his contempt for the principle of liberty. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 574-75 (1991), he stated that "there is no basis for thinking that our society
has ever shared that Thoreauvian "you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-
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been accepted by six members of the Supreme Court as expressing their
understanding of the right to privacy.77 By focusing on the effect that the law has
on a person's personal, intimate choices, this doctrinal shift legitimizes the
consequentialist approach that Justice Blackmun employed in Roe in applying the
right to privacy.
B. The Right to Privacy includes "certain intimate conduct" not because the
sexual act itself usually occurs in private, but because of the central importance
of sexual relationships in people's lives.
Justice Kennedy opened his opinion in Lawrence not with the facts of the case
or its procedural history, but rather by expressing the idea that the constitutional
right to privacy not only prohibits the government from invading private spaces in
our homes, but that it also prevents the government from controlling our private
lives." He stated:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into
a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the
person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.79
someone-else" beau ideal - much less for thinking that it was written into the Constitution."
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
76 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7 This passage was adopted by the five-member majority in Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at
2484, as well as Justice O'Connor in Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
78 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475. The opening passage of Lawrence states the
principal theme of the opinion, just like the opening sentence of the plurality opinion in
Casey, where Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter summarized the principal thrust of
their opinion reaffirming Roe, stating: "Liberty finds no refuge in ajurisprudence of doubt."
Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. Another stylistic device that appears in both Casey and Lawrence
is the resonance between the first and last words of each opinion. The first and the last word
in the opinion of the plurality in Casey is "liberty." Casey, 505 U.S. at 844, 901 (plurality
opinion). The first word of Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence is "liberty," and the last word is
'"reedom." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475, 2484. Dante Alighieri used a similar construction
in The Divine Comedy. The last word of each book of the trilogy is "stelle" (stars). See
DANTE ALIGHIERI, THEDIVINECOMEDY, HELL 142, PURGATORY 140, PARADISE 136 (Louis
Biancolli trans., 1966).
" Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
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In the course of his opinion Justice Kennedy leads the Court, and by extension
this Nation, to a deeper understanding of the right to privacy. In Lawrence, the
concept of "privacy" evolves from an objective, concrete rule into a subjective,
abstract principle.80 The result is a constitutional right that has more in common
with First Amendment principles of freedom of expression than it does to Fourth
Amendment rules against unreasonable searches.
The same transformation occurred in the Court's understanding of Equal
Protection between 1896 and 1954. In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court
examined the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that required "equal but
separate" accommodations for blacks and whites on railroad cars."' In subsequent
decisions, the Court held that laws requiring separate facilities for African
Americans were constitutional so long as the accommodations were "substantially
equal." 2 However, beginning in 1938, the Court became increasingly skeptical that
separate facilities could be made equal. In the "graduate school cases," the Court
struck down a number of segregation schemes as it became increasingly aware of
the fact that intangible factors made it impossible for racially segregated
educational facilities to be equal.8 3 In Sweatt v. Painter the Court held that a newly
founded law school for African Americans was not equal to the established law
school for whites at the University of Texas not only because of inequality of the
physical facilities of the two schools, but more importantly, because of the
intangible factors that make for greatness in a law school.' Furthermore, the Court
80 See generally Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and
Realism, 48 VIL. L. REV. 305, 372-79 (2003) (explaining the evolution of rules and
standards which occurs through judicial application).
8 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring "equal but separate"
accommodations for the races in railway cars).
82 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 96 (1941) ("It does not appear that
colored passengers who have bought first-class tickets for transportation by the carrier are
given accommodations which are substantially equal to those afforded to white passengers.");
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 344 (1938) (noting that "the obligation of
the State to provide negroes with advantages for higher education substantially equal to the
advantages afforded to white students").
83 See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that separation of
students in classrooms and the library deprived him of an equal education); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding that the newly founded law school for blacks was not equal to
the established law school for whites at the University of Texas); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam) (requiring state to admit qualified
applicant to state law school); Gaines, 305 U.S. 337 (requiring state to admit black applicant
to state law school rather than send applicant to out-of-state law school).
4 See 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950). The Court stated:
Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the original or
the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality in the
educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State. In
terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for
[Vol. 12:65
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL REVOLUTION
ruled it was unconstitutional for the State of Texas to establish a separate law
school for blacks because law is an "intensely practical" profession, and a legal
education taken in isolation from racial groups numbering eighty-five percent of the
population of the state was not "substantially equal" to the education that the
applicant would receive at the University of Texas. 5 In McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents,8 6 the Court held that it was unconstitutional to confine a black
graduate student to separate areas in the classroom, library, and cafeteria, 7 because
"[s]uch restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions
and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession."8 8
The Court observed that "[tihe removal of the state restrictions will not necessarily
abate individual and group predilections, prejudices and choices. But at the very
least, the state will not be depriving appellant of the opportunity to secure
specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law
review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior.
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few,
include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.
Id.
85 Id. at 634. The Court stated:
The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its
student body members of the racial groups which number 85% of the population
of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other
officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a
member of the Texas Bar. With such a substantial and significant segment of
society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is
substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the University
of Texas Law School.
Id.
86 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (forbidding state university from separating graduate student from
others on account of his race).
87 See id. at 640.
[McLaurin] was required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom
adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the
library, but not to use the desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a
designated table and to eat at a different time from the other students in the
school cafeteria.
Id. Following trial, and during the pendency of the appeal, these conditions were modified:
He is now assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row specified for colored
students; he is assigned to a table in the library on the main floor; and he is
permitted to eat at the same time in the cafeteria as other students, although here
again he is assigned to a special table.
Id.
88 Id. at 641.
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acceptance by his fellow students on his own merits."89 Finally, in Brown v. Board
of Education,90 the Court outlawed official segregation of public schools altogether
because of the psychological impact of segregation on black children. The Court
stated, "To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."'" In Plessy, the Court noted that, although some had argued that enforced
segregation implied the inferiority of the black race, "[i]f this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it."92 In Brown, the Court overruled this finding from
Plessy, stating, "Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge
at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [of harm from segregation] is amply
supported by modem authority.
93
In Brown the Supreme Court held that "in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place," because "[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."94 In subsequent cases, this principle was extended
to all incidents of state-sponsored segregation.9" Ultimately, the constitutional
violation of segregation lay not in the physical inequality of the schools, parks,
railroads, and beaches that were reserved for blacks, but in the psychological injury
inflicted by the government policy that, as Justice Harlan had predicted in his
dissenting opinion in Plessy, "puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a
large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disguise of
'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any
one, nor atone for the wrong this day done."96
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy outlines a similar evolution in our understanding
of the right to privacy. He returns repeatedly to the theme that he established in the
opening paragraph of the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects liberty
"both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions."97 Ultimately, what dooms
89 Id. at 641-42.
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down the doctrine of separate but equal in the field of
public education).
91 Id. at 494.
92 Plessy, 163 U.S. at551.
" Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
94 Id. at 495.
9
' In a series of per curiam decisions, the Supreme Court struck down state-sponsored
segregation of public beaches, golf courses, buses, etc., citing Brown, 347 U.S. 483. The per
curiamn decisions are listed in RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONsTrrUnONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.9(b) (3d ed. 1999).
96 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9" Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
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the Texas statute prohibiting homosexual intimacy is the fact that this law causes
senseless psychological harm to many of our citizens.9
Justice Kennedy commenced his substantive due process analysis in Lawrence
with Griswold v. Connecticut,99 observing that "[t]he Court described the protected
interest as a right to privacy and placed emphasis on the marriage relation and the
protected space of the marital bedroom.""' He then noted that the Court expanded
its definition of the right to privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird,'' where it extended its
understanding of the right to privacy to include the right of the individual to decide
"whether to bear or beget a child."'102 Justice Kennedy stated that in Roe the Court
had "cited cases that protect spatial freedom and cases that go well beyond it,"' 3
and that "Roe recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental
decisions affecting her destiny."'" According to Justice Kennedy, Eisenstadt, Roe,
and Carey v. Population Services International' established that the right to
privacy extended beyond married adults. 0 6 Justice Kennedy observed that this was
the state of the law when Bowers came before the Court in 1986.'07
Justice Kennedy then turned his attention to an examination of the Bowers
decision, and he took aim at the very heart of the Court's analysis, contending that
the majority in Bowers had misconstrued the issue that was before the Court.'08
Justice White had stated, "The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.... " 09 As a
rejoinder to this, Justice Kennedy maintained in Lawrence that Justice White's
statement of the issue was demeaning - demeaning to homosexuals, to
98 Id. at 2482 (discussing the stigma that the sodomy law imposed upon homosexuals).
'9 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut statute that outlawed use of
contraceptive devices).
"o Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (describing the reasoning of Griswold).
101 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down a law forbidding the distribution of contraceptive
devices to unmarried persons).
102 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
(quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453)).
103 Id.
104 id.
105 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down a law forbidding sale of contraceptive devices to
persons under 16 years of age).
"o Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 ("Both Eisenstadt and Carey, as well as the holding and
rationale in Roe, confirmed that the reasoning of Griswold could not be confined to the
protection of rights of married adults.").
107 Id. ('This was the state of the law with respect to some of the most relevant cases when
the Court considered Bowers v. Hardwick.").
'o" Id. at 2477-78.
109 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 187, 190 (1986).
2003]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
heterosexuals, to married persons, to single persons, to anyone who has ever had a
sexual relationship." 0 In a passage that will likely have a profound impact on the
future development of the law, Justice Kennedy turns our attention from the
performance of sexual conduct to the creation of intimate relationships. He stated:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers
and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit
a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more
far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals."'
Justice Kennedy reiterated that the issue in Bowers and Lawrence is not simply
about the right to engage in homosexual conduct, but the right to enter into intimate
relationships with persons of the same sex, stating:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon
this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice." 2
Speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy says that homosexuals
are entitled to respect for their personal lives:
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent
from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual
lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.
The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
I id.
112 id.
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conduct without intervention of the government. "It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter.""' 3
Just as the Supreme Court in Brown overturned the psychological findings of
Plessy, the Supreme Court in Lawrence dismissed the psychological assumptions
of Bowers. In Bowers, the Court said:
This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against sodomy
between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in
particular, are wise or desirable.... The issue presented is whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time."4
The Lawrence Court came to the conclusion that laws against same-sex sexual
relations are not simply unwise or undesirable, but are unjust. Just as state-
sponsored segregation stigmatized African American children, laws against
"homosexual conduct" demean gays and lesbians, and, one might add, have done
so for a very long time."' Because of that, these laws are unconstitutional.
C. The Court will look to legal developments in other nations, in particular
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in defining our fundamental
rights.
In support of its decision invalidating the Texas statute, the majority in
Lawrence relied upon legal developments in Europe and elsewhere decriminalizing
homosexual conduct. Justice Kennedy pointed out that a number of nations have
taken this step:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization,
it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been
rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has followed
not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. Other
nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct. The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as
"I ld. at 2484 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847).
114 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
"' See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET (1999) (describing legal oppression of homosexuals).
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an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has
been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.'
6
Justice Kennedy specifically cited the decision of the British Parliament to
repeal laws punishing homosexual conduct," 7 and stated that the decision of the
European Court of Human Justice in Dudgeon, which is binding in forty-five
European countries, was "of even more importance."' 
8
The Court's citation to foreign authority was couched as a rebuttal to the
arguments of Chief Justice Burger in Bowers that Judeo-Christian values
condemned homosexual conduct and that Western civilization criminalized it." 9
But in a television interview following the decision in Lawrence, Justice Breyer
indicated that when the Court invoked foreign precedent in Lawrence it was doing
more than simply responding to Chief Justice Burger's "sweeping references."' 20
Rather, the Court was acknowledging that defining fundamental human rights under
the United States Constitution is not simply a matter of domestic concern, but will
affect how we will live together with people from other nations:
Through commerce, through globalization, through the spread of
democratic institutions, through immigration to America, it's becoming
more and more one world of many different kinds of people.... And
how they're going to live together across the world will be the challenge,
and whether our Constitution and how it fits into the governing
documents of other nations, I think will be a challenge for the next
generations. "'
116 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (citations omitted).
117 Id. at 2481 ("A committee advising the British Parliament reconmended in 1957 repeal
of laws punishing homosexual conduct. The Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on
Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution (1963). Parliament enacted the substance of those
recommendations 10 years later. Sexual Offences Act 1967, § 1.").
Id.
8 Id. ("Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21
nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the
claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.").
119 Id. ("The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of Western
civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take account of other
authorities pointing in an opposite direction.").
120 Interview with Breyer & O'Connor, JJ., on ABC, This Week (July 6, 2003).
121 John H. Cushman Jr., O'Connor Not Retiring: Justice Dispels Rumor of Her Leaving
Court, THE HOUS. CHRON., July 7, 2003 at IA. Justice Breyer indicated that this was not
solely his position, but that of Justice O'Connor and other justices as well, stating, "We see
all the time, Justice O'Connor and I, and the others, how the world really - it's trite but it's
true - is growing together." Id.
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Since the publication of Bruce Ackerman's 1997 article, The Rise of World
Constitutionalism, 2 2 which called upon the American legal academy to examine
constitutional developments in other nations, 123 there has been an explosion of
scholarly research into comparative constitutional law.24 A central question is
whether and how the decisions of constitutional courts from other nations should
be taken into account in the interpretation of the United States Constitution.
Professor Peter Quint succinctly poses the question:
[A] great question for American jurists is whether we also can foresee
a time in which international principles of human rights - as embodied
in international agreements or in the general principles of international
law, and elaborated through our examination of comparative doctrine -
may have an effect on the internal definition of American constitutional
rights. 1
25
In an exhaustive and influential article, Professor Mark Tushnet concludes that
"U.S. courts can sometimes gain insights into the appropriate interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution by a cautious and careful analysis of constitutional experience
elsewhere."'2 6
122 Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 771 (1997).
,23 See id. at 774 (addressing American law professors, stating, "We have a serious
responsibility here.").
124 See, e.g., Louis J. Blum, Mixed Signals: The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 157, 200 (2002) (arguing that American
courts use foreign authority for certain limited purposes); Paolo G. Carozza, "My Friend Is
a Stranger": The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L.
REv. 1031 (2003) (arguing for a noninterventionist global recognition of human rights); Jens
C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation,
14 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 513, 558-59 (2002) (applying discourse theory of Habermas to
analyze legitimacy of use of foreign authority); Ute Krodewagen, Political Symbols in Two
Constitutional Orders: The Flag Desecration Decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and the German Federal Constitutional Court, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 679 (2002)
(contrasting American and German decisions and rationales on flag desecration); Peter J.
Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 730
(2002) (arguing that globalization will likely subject the United States to international
norms).
125 Peter E. Quint, International Human Rights: The Convergence of Comparative and
International Law, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 605, 608 (2001) (arguing that comparative law and
international law are converging, creating internationally shared legal norms).
126 Mark V. Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALEL.J.
1225, 1228-29 (1999) (describing three methods ofconstitutional borrowing: functionalism,
expressivism, and bricolage). But see Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some
Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640
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In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia contended that precedent from other
nations is irrelevant to determining our fundamental rights, noting that the only
pertinent question in Lawrence was whether "the claimed right to sodomy" is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'27 He claimed that the
Court's discussion of "foreign views" is not only "meaningless dicta," but is also
"[d]angerous dicta" because the Court "should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans."' 28 He also complained that the majority "ignor[es], of
course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy."' 29
However, Justice Scalia does not identify which nations of the world still
criminalize homosexual conduct. 30
The Court's citation to judicial precedent from a foreign nation in Lawrence is
a consequence of its decision to expressly reject the "specific tradition" test favored
by Justice Scalia in favor of reliance on the "emerging awareness" of society. The
Court recently made a similar reference to foreign authority in Atkins v. Virginia'
when it determined that "evolving standards of decency" prohibited the execution
of the mentally retarded. 32 In Atkins, Justice Stevens observed that "within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.' ' 133 In both Atkins and
(1999).
127 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986)).
"28 Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's discussion of these foreign views
(ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy)
is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this Court... should not
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."') (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537
U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
129 id
"3o Justice Scalia might have cited Iran and Afghanistan under the Taliban as countries
punishing homosexual acts. See Afghanistan's Taliban Execute Threefor Buggery, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 26, 1998 (describing execution of three gay men by the Taliban);
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death: Political Asylum and the Global
Persecution of Lesbians and Gay Men, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 605, 620-21 (1993)
(describing Iranian law prescribing death as penalty for third offenses of homosexuality).
In Lawrence, Justice Scalia stated that there were four executions for homosexual conduct
in colonial America as support of his argument that the right to engage in homosexual
relations is not deeply rooted in American tradition. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2494 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). He did not condemn the executions nor did he in any way qualify his reliance
upon this practice. Id.
13" 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded prisoners violates
the Eighth Amendment).
132 Id. at 321 ("Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our
'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and
that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of
a mentally retarded offender.") (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)).
',3 Id. at 316 n.21. Justice Stevens' reference to foreign practices, in effect, rejected the
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in Lawrence the Court consulted the experience of other nations in the
interpretation of the Constitution because in those cases the constitutionality of the
laws under review was not determined solely by reference to specific American
traditions, but rather by whether the laws were consistent with "evolving
standards"'34 or "emerging awareness."' 3" This trend towards reference to foreign
authority was also stimulated in Lawrence by the holding, explained in the
following portion of this article, that traditional notions of morality standing alone
are no longer sufficient to justify prohibitory laws. Instead, the state is obligated
to explain how every law will prevent or deter specific harm.
Both of these factors - the importance of the activity in the life of the
individual and the consequences of allowing people to engage in the activity - are
exceedingly complex judgments requiring the most careful and thorough
consideration. These are not judgments that may be lightly undertaken, nor are they
judgments that are unique to American society.'36 As the majority observes: 'The
right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country
the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more
legitimate or urgent."'37
As viewed by the majority, the central question in Lawrence was whether
homosexual relationships are important and valuable and therefore entitled to
respect. There is no good reason to limit the inquiry into this question to domestic
sources. This is a question that is of universal application. It is a judgment
concerning human potential, not a question of American tradition. Having adopted
a "human rights" approach to defining our fundamental rights in place of Justice
Scalia's "specific tradition" test, the Court wisely draws upon the experience of
other nations that share our commitment to liberty and equality.
The decision to cite the fundamental law of other nations reflects a sea change
in the Court's understanding of our fundamental rights. Does the Constitution
create our fundamental rights, or does it merely acknowledge preexisting human
rights? Do our fundamental rights originate in the adoption and ratification of the
Constitution, or are they a birthright? Is the Constitution essentially a "contract"
position taken by the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), where Justice
Scalia, speaking for the majority, rejected reliance on the practice of other nations to not
execute juveniles, stating, "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive." Id.
at 369 n. 1.
'14 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
,3' Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 ("In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the
past half century are of most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness
that liberty give substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.") (emphasis added).
136 Id. at 2483.
137 Id.
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between the people and the government, or is it instead a statement of fundamental
truths about human nature? 3 ' The Declaration of Independence is definitely of the
latter category, but it is not treated as "law," rather merely as a statement of
principles.' 39 The language of the Casey plurality, adopted by a majority of the
Court in Lawrence, implies a universal understanding of human dignity that would
turn the Constitution from being a social contract with specific, determinative
meanings into a statement of universal fundamental principles that are nevertheless
binding upon our government. 40
Justice Scalia is certainly correct in noting that the laws and customs of other
nations may not be consonant with our traditional values. 4' Furthermore, it may
be that globalization and immigration will result not in increased harmony of
values, but rather will bring our Nation into collision with incompatible systems,
perhaps even creating "irrepressible conflict" '142 as occurred between slavery and
13 See generally Ronald R. Garet, Creation and Commitment: Lincoln, Thomas, and the
Declaration ofIndependence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1477 (1992). Professor Garet attributes the
different fates of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas to their views on this point:
What sank Judge Bork, however, was not so much his adherence to the intent of
the Framers as his professed disbelief in natural rights. The final, fatal image of
Judge Bork was of a man who, turning conservatism upside down, believed that
we enjoy only those rights against government that the official legal texts
expressly give us. By contrast, Clarence Thomas's celebration of the Declaration
of Independence seems less legalistic in the bad sense, more supportive of
natural rights that we enjoy just because we are human persons.
Id. at 1483.
139 See Thomas B. McAffee, Does the Federal Constitution Incorporate the Declaration
of Independence?, 1 NEV. L.J. 138, 144-45 (2001) ('The framers may have believed in
inalienable rights, but one of those inalienable rights was the power of the people to make
fundamental decisions about their government, including the limits that should be imposed
on it."). But see Dan Himmelfarb, The Constitutional Relevance of the Second Sentence of
the Declaration of Independence, 100 YALE L.J. 169, 187 (1990). Himmelfarb contends:
[T]he prevailing scholarly consensus misconceives the relevance of the
Declaration. According to that consensus, the Declaration is a work of
propaganda, an instrument of separation, or a lawyer's brief- anything, in short,
but a statement of foundational principles designed to serve as a guide for the
framers of a constitution of government. This view should not go unchallenged.
140 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (adopting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.").
"41 See, e.g., Krodewagen, supra note 124, at 681 (discussing the differences between
American and German attitudes towards the national flag and towards toleration of dissent,
and concluding, "While the American concept of democracy is based on the spirit of popular
sovereignty, the German concept of democracy is based on the notion that a democratic state
needs to defend its own foundations.").
142 In 1858, Governor William Seward delivered his famous "irrepressible conflict"
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free labor economic and political systems in nineteenth-century America, or
between communistic and capitalistic economic and political systems in the
twentieth century.'4 3 Justice Scalia himself refers to the conflict that underlies the
gay-rights cases as a "culture war."' 44 If it be so, it is not a war that is confined to
the United States of America. Our society will need to consider the experiences and
values of all peoples in order to draw the judgments about human potential that the
Lawrence ruling requires of us.
speech, explaining why the slavery issue was coming to a head:
Our country is a theatre which exhibits in full operation two radically different
political systems: the one resting on the basis of servile labor, the other on the
basis of voluntary labor of free men.... Hitherto the two systems have existed
in different States, but side by side within the American Union. This has
happened because the Union is a confederation of States. But in another aspect
the United States constitutes only one nation. Increase of population, which is
filling the States out of their very borders, together with a new and extended
network of railroads and other avenues, and an internal commerce which daily
becomes more intimate, is rapidly bringing the States into a higher and more
perfect social unity or consolidation. Thus, these antagonistic systems are
continually coming into closer contact, and collision results.
Shall I tell you what this collision means? They who think it is accidental,
unnecessary, the work of interested or fanatical agitators, and therefore
ephemeral, mistake the case altogether. It is an irrepressible conflict between
opposing and enduring forces, and it means that the United States must and will
sooner or later become either entirely a slave-holding nation or entirely a free-
labor nation.
William H. Seward, An Irrepressible Conflict, Address Delivered in Rochester, N.Y. (Oct.
25, 1858), in THE CAUSES OF THE CIVW WAR 132 (Kenneth M. Stampp ed., 1959) (citing
THE WORKS OF WIIAM H. SEWARD 292 (George E. Baker ed., 1855)).
'4 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 209-18 (1996) (examining the evolving conflict between Islam
and the West). But see John Shattuck, Religion, Rights, and Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTs.
J. 183, 188 (2003).
[T]he terrorism of September 11 was caused in large part by the hijacking of a
religion and the suppression of human rights in the Islamic world. Islam was not
a cause of the terrorism, it was a victim, and it is now in danger of becoming a
scapegoat as well.
Id.
144 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is clear from this that the
Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral
observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed."); see also Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf
for a fit of spite.").
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D. Morality, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis for prohibitory legislation.
Instead, the state must explain how behavior is harmful before it can make it
unlawful.
Another stunning change in Fourteenth Amendment doctrine wrought by the
Court in Lawrence was its decision to adopt the following simple proposition from
Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick: "[T]he fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not
a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor
tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack."' 45
Because the State of Texas had failed to identify any specific, identifiable
harms resulting from homosexual conduct, the statute proscribing such conduct was
ruled unconstitutional. " Justice Kennedy explained that the Lawrence case did not
involve objective harms such as those resulting from sexual activity with children,
sexual imposition on nonconsenting persons, public acts of indecency, or
prostitution. 47 Nor was Lawrence concerned with defining or protecting the
institution of marriage.'48 On the contrary, Kennedy stated:
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent
from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual
lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives.... The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual. 149
Justice Scalia vigorously disagreed with this holding. In his view, the reasoning
of the majority spells "the end of all morals legislation,"'50 including laws against
"' Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (adopting Justice Stevens's reasoning from Bowers, 478
U.S. at 216, and stating, "Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling
in Bowers and should control here.").
'4 Id. at 2484 ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.").
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated:
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain
forms of sexual behavior are "immoral and unacceptable" . . . Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) - the same interest furthered by criminal
laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity.
Bowers held that this was a legitimate state interest. The Court today reaches the
opposite conclusion. The Texas statute, it says, "furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
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"fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity."15 ' The
implication of Justice Scalia's argument is that the majority strikes at the heart of
moral decisionmaking because it disables the majority of the people from enacting
their moral choices into law.' Justice Scalia expressed the view that the Court
should not take sides in what is a "culture war", |' and that "it is the premise of our
system that those judgments are to be made by the people, and not imposed by a
governing caste that knows best."' 54  The following passage is the fullest
development of Justice Scalia's vision of moral conflict and moral change:
Social perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time, and
every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of
such matters is the best. That homosexuals have achieved some success
in that enterprise is attested to by the fact that Texas is one of the few
remaining States that criminalize private, consensual homosexual acts.
But persuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one's
views in absence of democratic majority will is something else. I would
no more require a State to criminalize homosexual acts - or, for that
matter, display any moral disapprobation of them - than I would forbid
it to do so. What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of
traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through
the invention of a brand-new "constitutional right" by a Court that is
impatient of democratic change.'5"
In my opinion, Justice Scalia's understanding of "morality" is fundamentally
different from that of the majority of the Court. Justice Scalia understands morality
individual... ." The Court embraces instead Justice Stevens' declaration in his
Bowers dissent, that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice ..." This effectively decrees the end
of all morals legislation. If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian
sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-
mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review.
Id. (citations omitted).
151 id.
15 See id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What Texas has chosen to do is well within the
range of traditional democratic action .... ).
... See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the
culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules
of engagement are observed."); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,652 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("I think it no business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to
take sides in this culture war.").
" Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155 Id.
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to be obedience to a set of rules established by higher authority."5 6 If one believes
that morality constitutes an authoritative code of conduct, it is not only reasonable
but imperative for the democratic majority to enact this code of conduct into law.'57
The moral understanding of the majority is fundamentally different. Consider,
once again, the central passage from Casey defining the right to privacy:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.'
Consistent with this passage is the idea that "intimate and personal choices"
constitute moral choices only if individuals are free to make those choices. The
essence of morality is the power to choose right from wrong. When choice is taken
away from the individual, it is no longer a question of morality, but a question of
law. The decision of the majority in Lawrence distinguishes "essentially moral
choices" from legal imperatives. 
159
Justice Scalia should listen to his own words: "[P]ersuading one's fellow
citizens is one thing, and imposing one's views ... is something else."'60 Moral
suasion is fundamentally different from governmental coercion, just as wrestling
156 See Peter M. Cicehino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of
"Public Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of Equal
Protection Review?, 87 GEo. L.J. 139 (1998). Professor Cicchino states that the views of
Justice Scalia are "fundamentally the same" as the natural law jurisprudence of John Finnis,
which he characterizes as "theology" and "essentially the same, as that made by the Roman
Catholic Church." Id. at 157, 162, 164 (contending that assertions of morality do not qualify
as a legitimate governmental interest).
1' See Romer, 517 U.S. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Amendment 2 is designed to
prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of
Coloradans.").
158 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
... Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) ("The law, however, is constantly
based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.").
"6 See text accompanying supra note 155.
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with one's conscience is different from taking a calculated risk of being caught.' 6
It is not a moral act to conform to the coercive legislation of the state, nor is it a
moral act to enact such legislation in the absence of evidence that the behavior is
harmful.
Despite Justice Scalia's fears, the decision of the Supreme Court in Lawrence
does not diminish people's rights to make moral judgments against homosexuality.
Under the First Amendment, people are free to condemn homosexual conduct, and
until private discriminatory acts are made unlawful, they are also free to
discriminate against homosexuals in all matters involving private conduct, including
employment and housing.' 62 Furthermore, even if homosexuals gain statutory
protection against private acts of discrimination, as a matter of constitutional right,
religious and expressive organizations will still be free to discriminate against
homosexuals,'63 and individuals will continue to have a constitutional right to
discriminate against homosexuals when making their own "intimate and personal
choices" such as whom to associate with on a personal basis. T What people may
not do under Lawrence is impose their views through legislation invoking the
coercive power of the state, unless the behavior being prohibited is harmful in some
way other than to people's moral sensibilities. The majority of the Court holds that
while individuals have the power to develop and disseminate their own beliefs as
to what is right and what is wrong, they do not have the right to enact their beliefs
into law unless there is some reason other than morality that justifies the law.
Morality is a matter of individual conscience, not compulsion. 65
161 See 1 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 17-19 (1981)
(distinguishing levels of moral development, in particular the preconventional stage of the
"punishment and obedience orientation," and the postconventional stages of "social contract
orientation" and the "universal ethical principle orientation").
'62 Under the "state action doctrine," private acts of discrimination are not violations of
the Constitution. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any [state] authority is simply
a private wrong, or a crime of that individual ... but if not sanctioned in some
way by the state, or not done under State authority, his rights remain in full force,
and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress.
Id.
163 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding right of Boy
Scouts to expel assistant scoutmaster who was homosexual).
'6 This right is preserved under the reasoning of Lawrence.
165 See Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises
Infecting Reproductive Rights, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 147,150 (1996) ("[T]he
unexamined premises in the legal building blocks of reproductive rights reflect an attitude
of disrespect for and mistrust of women and of their moral capacity to make difficult
decisions.").
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I1. THE JURISDPRUDENTIAL REVOLUTION IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
The decisions of the Court in Lawrence and Grutter and the concurring opinion
of Justice O'Connor in Lawrence work profound changes in the interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause. As it did with respect to the right of liberty, the Court
adopts a contextual, consequentialist approach to defining the constitutional
principle of equality. In particular, laws that stigmatize groups of people and laws
that inhibit people's personal relationships are subjected to heightened levels of
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In addition, in her concurring opinion
in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor stated that "moral disapproval" of a group or its
actions, standing alone, is an insufficient reason to justify laws that discriminate
against the group."6 This reinforces the ruling of the majority that moral
disapproval of conduct is insufficient to support the constitutionality of legislation
under the Due Process Clause.'67
The principal jurisprudential shift that is signaled by Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Grutter"'6 is one that upsets the consistency of the standards of review
established by the Court in previous cases.
A. The level of scrutiny that the Court applies in evaluating the constitutionality
of laws under the Equal Protection Clause varies with the context. Neither strict
scrutiny not rational basis is applied the same in all cases.
In determining the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action in
university admissions in Grutter, Justice O'Connor made the following statement:
"Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal
Protection Clause."'169 She explained that although "strict scrutiny" applies to all
race-based classifications, "[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context."' 170
Justice O'Connor said that she was applying strict scrutiny, to evaluate the
constitutionality of the law in Grutter,"7' but in fact she did not. At key points in
her opinion she deferred to the judgment of college and graduate school admissions
" Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
167 Id. at 2484.
168 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325.
169 id. at 2338.
170 Id.
171 See id. at 2339 ("Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict
for taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within
the expertise of the university.").
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officers. She stated, "The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity
is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer,"'' 2 and "[o]ur
holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits."' 7 3 This
is a significant departure from the normal requirement of strict scrutiny which
places the burden of proof on the state.7 4 Justice O'Connor justified her deference
to educational authorities on the ground that universities have a First Amendment
interest in "educational autonomy," citing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke in
support of this proposition."'
Justice O'Connor's deferential version of strict scrutiny in Grutter stands in
stark contrast to Justice Rehnquist's application of the doctrine in the companion
case Gratz v. Bollinger,76 striking down the race-based affirmative action
admissions program in the undergraduate program of the University of Michigan.'77
Quoting from the Court's decision inAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena' and City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 79 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that strict
scrutiny places the burden of proof on the state to justify the law:
It is by now well established that "all racial classifications reviewable
under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized." This
"standard of review.., is not dependent on the race of those burdened
or benefited by a particular classification." Thus, "any person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor
subject to the Constitutionjustify any racial classification subjecting that
person to unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny."8
172 Id.
173 id.
'71 See infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
171 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339. Justice O'Connor stated:
In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state
interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional
dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy: "The
freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body." From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that
by claiming "the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the
'robust exchange of ideas,"' a university "seeks to achieve a goal that is of
paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission."
Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978)) (citation
omitted).
176 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
177 id.
178 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down state law creating "set-aside" for minority business
enterprises in public works programs).
179 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
"" Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc.
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In their dissenting opinions in Grutter, the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Kennedy all criticized the majority for deferring to educational
authorities. 8'" Like the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy
emphasized that strict scrutiny places the burden of proof upon the state to
demonstrate the constitutionality of the affirmative action program, that is, to prove
both that its policies are likely to achieve their purposes and that these policies are
the least discriminatory means of achieving those purposes.8 2
Justice O'Connor's deferential model of strict scrutiny in Grutter is not the only
modification that she makes to traditional standards of review. In her concurring
opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor stated that rational basis analysis is also
contextual, noting that in certain cases the Court has applied "a more searching
version of rational basis."'8 3 In particular, she reasoned that laws that exhibit a
desire to harm politically unpopular groups, laws that express moral disapproval of
particular groups, and laws that inhibit personal relationships are scrutinized more
strictly than laws that do not. Furthermore, in explaining why the Texas law
criminalizing homosexual conduct was unconstitutional, like the majority in
Lawrence, Justice O'Connor placed great reliance on the fact that this law
stigmatized gays and lesbians as criminals.' 84
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 202, 224 (1995), and Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)) (citations
omitted).
, ' See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2356 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Under strict scrutiny, the Law School's assessment of the benefits of racial discrimination
and devotion to the admissions status quo are not entitled to any sort of deference, grounded
in the First Amendment or anywhere else."); id. at 2366 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that
review is unprecedented in its deference."); id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In the
context of university admissions the objective of racial diversity can be accepted based on
empirical data known to us, but deference is not to be given with respect to the methods by
which it is pursued.").
182 See id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ('The majority's
broad deference to both the Law School's judgment that racial aesthetics leads to educational
benefits and its stubborn refusal to alter the status quo in admissions methods finds no basis
in the Constitution or decisions of this Court."); id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The
Law School has the burden of proving, in conformance with the standard of strict scrutiny,
that it did not utilize race in an unconstitutional way.").
183 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2485 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
We have consistently held, however, that some objectives, such as "a bare...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group," are not legitimate state
interests.... When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular
group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.(citations omitted).
"s Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The adoption of "higher order rational basis" and "lower order strict scrutiny"
essentially signals acceptance of the "sliding scale" Equal Protection standard
advocated by Justice John Paul Stevens in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.'
8 5
This point is examined in more detail below. 1
86
B. Laws that intentionally stigmatize people are scrutinized more strictly than
laws that do not.
In Lawrence, both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor stated that
"stigmatization" militates against the constitutionality of a law. Justice Kennedy
stated that there was a "tenable argument" for striking down the Texas statute under
the Equal Protection Clause because it punished homosexuals, but not
heterosexuals, for engaging in certain sexual acts.8 7 However, he proceeded to
argue that invalidating the law under Equal Protection would be an inadequate
remedy because the state could cure the unconstitutionality simply by extending the
prohibition to heterosexual couples, leaving the holding of Bowers v. Hardwick
intact. Leaving Bowers intact as precedent, said Justice Kennedy, would fail to
erase the stigma that that case imposes upon homosexuals.' The Bowers decision,
according to Justice Kennedy, "demeans the lives of homosexual persons."'8 9 He
stated:
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains
unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if
it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The
central holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and
185 473 U.S. 432, 451-52 (1985).
186 See infra text accompanying notes 226-28.
87 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and some
amici contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument, but we
conclude the instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has
continuing validity.
Id.
181 Id. ("Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the
conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.").
189 Id.
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it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives
of homosexual persons. 9°
Justice Kennedy added, "The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover,
is not trivial."' He outlined the legal and social consequences of being convicted
for committing "homosexual conduct," including the fact that conviction for this
offense would be placed upon the person's record,' 92 persons convicted of this
offense would have to register as "sex offenders" in four states, 193 and the
conviction would have to be noted on job application forms.' 94 For Justice
Kennedy, "stigmatization" was the principal reason for overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick.
Justice O'Connor concurred with this point by observing that conviction under
the Texas statute carries negative consequences for defendants, including being
barred from certain professions and having to register as a sex offenders.'
However, Justice O'Connor added that the law stigmatized all homosexuals because
it "brands all homosexuals as criminals," and thereby sanctions acts of
discrimination against them.'96 She stated:
[T]he effect of Texas' sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of
prosecution or consequence of conviction. Texas' sodomy law brands
all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for
homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else. Indeed,
Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral effects of the
law, stipulating in a prior challenge to this action that the law "legally
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. ("The petitioners will bear on their record the history of their criminal
convictions.").
193 Id. at 2482 ("We are advised that if Texas convicted an adult for private, consensual
homosexual conduct under the statute here in question the convicted person would come
within the registration laws of a least four States were he or she to be subject to their
jurisdiction.").
"9 Id. ("[T]he Texas criminal conviction carries with it the other collateral consequences
always following a conviction, such as notations on job application forms, to mention but one
example.").
9 Id. at 2485-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated:
As the Court notes ... petitioners' convictions, if upheld, would disqualify them
from or restrict their ability to engage in a variety of professions, including
medicine, athletic training, and interior design. Indeed, were petitioners to move
to one of four States, their convictions would require them to register as sex
offenders to local law enforcement.
Id. (citations omitted).
196 Id. at 2486.
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sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways
unrelated to the criminal law," including in the areas of "employment,
family issues, and housing."'
197
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the Texas criminal statute
proscribing homosexual conduct imposes a "lifelong penalty and stigma" upon gays
and lesbians.'9 8 She stated:
A State can of course assign certain consequences to a violation of its
criminal law. But the State cannot single out one identifiable class of
citizens for punishment that does not apply to everyone else, with moral
disapproval as the only asserted state interest for the law. The Texas
sodomy statute subjects homosexuals to "a lifelong penalty and stigma.
A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an underclass
... cannot be reconciled with" the Equal Protection Clause.'"
Accordingly, both Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Lawrence, and
Justice O'Connor, writing separately, identify stigmatization as a principal reason
for overturning the Texas law against "homosexual conduct."
The question of stigmatization looms large in Grutter as well. Traditionally,
those who favor affirmative action contend that strict scrutiny is inapplicable
because affirmative action programs are not intended to stigmatize racial minorities,
but are instead intended to expand opportunity.2" ° Justice Thurgood Marshall, for
'9' Id. (quoting State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992)).
'9' Id. at 2487.
'9' Id. (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J. concurring)).
200 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting
in part) (evaluating affirmative action admissions program under intermediate scrutiny); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 535 (1989) (Marshall, I., dissenting)
(evaluating minority business set-aside under intermediate scrutiny); see also Mark Strasser,
Plessy, Brown, and HBCUS: On the Imposition of Stigma and the Court's Mechanical Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 48, 69 (2000) (criticizing the Court's
"mechanical jurisprudence" of applying strict scrutiny in reviewing affirmative action).
Professor Strasser states:
Plessy upheld racial segregation in railway cars, refusing to recognize the
stigmatization that such a law entailed. Brown took account of both the social
meaning of segregation and empirical data suggesting that state-imposed
segregation caused real and lasting harms. The current Court has adopted a
mechanical approach to race-conscious remedies, which seems both to prevent
the state from ameliorating the effects of past discrimination and also to allow
if not encourage private actors to continue to discriminate.
Id.; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability", 86 VA. L. REV.
397 (2000) (arguing in favor of a "subordination-focused approach" to interpreting the
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example, dissenting in Croson, stated:
Today, for the first time, a majority of this Court has adopted strict
scrutiny as its standard of Equal Protection Clause review of race-
conscious remedial measures. This is an unwelcome development. A
profound difference separates governmental actions that themselves are
racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior
racism or to prevent neutral governmental activity from perpetuating the
effects of such racism.
20
'
Accordingly, Justice Marshall and other justices argued that affirmative action
programs ought to be evaluated under the lesser standard of "intermediate
scrutiny.
Stigmatization is also a central argument of the opponents of affirmative action.
The commentator Larry Elder, for example, argues that "white condescension does
more damage than good. 2 3 This is a principal theme of Justice Thomas' dissenting
opinion in Grutter.°4 Justice Thomas contends that affirmative action stigmatizes
blacks by underestimating their abilities 2 5  and diminishing their
accomplishments. 2 6  Whether one favors or opposes affirmative action, the
presence or absence of stigmatization is a principal factor determining its
constitutionality.
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Americans With Disabilities Act.).
201 Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("My view has long been that race-conscious
classifications designed to further remedial goals 'must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives' in order to
withstand constitutional scrutiny.") (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (1978)).
203 LARRY ELDER, THE TEN THINGS YOU CAN'T SAY IN AMERICA 68 (2000).
204 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2350-2365 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas commences his dissenting opinion with a
quotation from Frederick Douglass answering "What the Black Man Wants," with the words,
"All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! . [Y]our
interference is doing him positive injury." Id. at 2350.
205 See id. ("I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the
meddling of university administrators.").
206 See id. at 2362 ("It is uncontested that each year, the Law School admits a handful of
blacks who would be admitted in the absence of racial discrimination. Who can differentiate
between those who belong and those who do not?") (citation omitted).
207 See generally Andrew F. Halaby & Stephen R. McAllister, An Analysis of the Supreme
Court's Reliance on Racial "Stigma" as a Constitutional Concept in Affirmative Action
Cases, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 235 (1997). Halaby and McAllister distinguish "inferiority-type
self-stigma" which was condemned in Brown from "inferiority-type other stigma" that is the
subject of later affirmative action cases such as Adarand and Croson. Id. at 281-82. The
authors state:
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There is a difference, however, between the stigmatization that was present in
Plessy and Brown and the stigmatization that Justice Thomas and others perceive
in affirmative action. The purpose of state-sponsored segregation was to humiliate
racial minorities and to relegate them to second-class citizenship. Whatever the
merits of affirmative action may be, it cannot be seriously maintained that this is its
purpose. While it may be argued that the effects of affirmative action are
debilitating for racial minorities, this is obviously not the intent of such programs.
Justice O'Connor implicitly drew this distinction in her discussion of the "narrow
tailoring" prong of strict scrutiny in Grutter, where she stated: "The purpose of the
narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that 'the means chosen 'fit' ...th[e]
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." ' 8
In finding that the law school's admission policy was "narrowly tailored," the
implicit conclusion of the Court in Grutter is that the university's policy was not
intended to stigmatize racial or ethnic minority groups. Laws that are intended to
stigmatize groups, such as the Texas law criminalizing homosexual conduct,
apparently stand on a far different footing than laws that may or may not have the
unintentional effect of stigmatizing a group.
The Court's initial constitutional concept of "stigma," which originated in Plessy
v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education, focused upon the particular strain
of inferiority-type self-stigma suffered by powerless nonbeneficiaries.
In the affirmative action cases of the past twenty years, however, the Court's
concept of "stigma" has developed differently in two critical respects. First, the
predominant view in the affirmative action cases.., is that the constitutionally
significant strain of stigma is inferiority-type other-stigma by powerless
beneficiaries, i.e., members of the preferred minority group. This strain differs
from the Plessy/Brown strain in both the source of the underlying negative
attribution - others besides the stigmatized group make the attribution,
generally Whites - and the distributive posture of the stigmatized group - they
are the beneficiaries of affirmative action rather than the nonbeneficiaries of, for
example, state-enforced segregation. Second, the Court has conferred
constitutional significance on an entirely new strain of stigma. This new "racism"
strain is one in which inferiority is not the "mark" conferred upon the group at
issue, but rather is one where the issue is perceived past racism of the powerful
nonbeneficiary group (i.e., Whites).
Each of these fundamental changes is subject to serious criticism....
Id.
208 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
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C. Laws that inhibit people's personal relationships are scrutinized more strictly
than laws that do not.
In Lawrence, Justice O'Connor states: "We have been most likely to apply
rational basis review to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause where, as here, the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships."2"9
This simple proposition explains what until now has been a curious anomaly in
constitutional law - the existence of two inconsistent standards of rational basis
review in equal protection cases.
The competing rational basis tests were both expressed in an early case,
Railway Express Agency v. New York.21 In evaluating the constitutionality of a law
that made it illegal to operate a vehicle for the purpose of selling advertising space
on it, Justice William Douglas took an extremely deferential approach:
[T]he fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind
of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a
different category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square, is
immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the
same genus be eradicated or none at all."'
In contrast, Justice Robert Jackson disagreed with Justice Douglas, questioning
whether the municipality could permit some people to engage in certain activity and
prohibit others from engaging in the same activity without a reason that explained
the difference in treatment. Justice Jackson stated, "As a matter of principle and in
view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do not think differences
of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of differences
unrelated to the legislative purpose." ' Justice Jackson explained that he thought
that the law was constitutional because there was a "real difference" between
advertising one's own business on a vehicle used for business, and operating a
vehicle for the purpose of advertising others' businesses.21
209 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2485 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding a municipal regulation prohibiting vehicles from
displaying advertisements for other businesses).
211 Id. at 110.
22 Id. at 115 (Jackson, J., concurring).
213 Id. at 115-16 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson stated:
I think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and
may be dealt with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not
merely because such a discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the
evil. That might be done by many classifications, which I should think wholly
unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real difference between doing in self-
interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate action from those
who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
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Over the years, in some Equal Protection cases, the Court has applied the
extremely deferential rational basis test of Justice Douglas, while in others it has
conducted a more searching review consistent with Justice Jackson's "real
differences" test. For example, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,214 the
Court upheld an environmental statute banning the sale of milk in plastic,
nonreturnable containers against an equal protection challenge on the ground that
the reasonableness of the distinction between plastic and cardboard containers was
"at least debatable." 21 5 In contrast, however, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.,2t 6 the Court applied the stricter rational-basis standard of Justice
Jackson in striking down a law that required a special use permit for the operation
of a group home for the mentally retarded but that did not require one for
fraternities, rest homes, or hospitals. 2 7 The Court stated:
It is true, as already pointed out, that the mentally retarded as a group are
indeed different from others not sharing their misfortune, and in this
respect they may be different from those who would occupy other
facilities that would be permitted in an R-3 zone without a special
permit. But this difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston
home and those who would occupy it would threaten legitimate interests
of the city in a way that other permitted uses such as boarding houses
and hospitals would not. Because in our view the record does not reveal
any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose
any special threat to the city's legitimate interests, we affirm the
promoted for a price.
Id.
214 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding law forbidding the sale of milk in nonreturnable,
plastic containers).
2'5 Id. at 469 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)).
216 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (declaring the city's special-use permit requirement regarding a
group home for the mentally retarded to be unconstitutional).
2I7 id. at 447-48. Justice White stated:
The constitutional issue is clearly posed. The city does not require a special use
permit in an R-3 zone for apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and
lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels,
hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged (other than
for the insane or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs or
fraternal orders, and other specified uses. It does, however, insist on a special
permit for the Featherston home, and it does so, as the District Court found,
because it would be a facility for the mentally retarded. May the city require the
permit for this facility when other care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely
permitted?
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judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as applied in
this case.218
The Supreme Court used the rational basis test to strike down laws in a number
of other cases as well. In United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno, the
Court invalidated a requirement of a federal food stamp program that denied
eligibility to unrelated persons living together,2"9 and in Romer v. Evans, the Court
struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that made it more difficult to
enact legislation forbidding discrimination against homosexuals. 22 In Lawrence,
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that a common rationale set forth in Cleburne,
Moreno, and Romer was that in each case the law in question was invalidated
because it was motivated by hostility towards the affected classes: hippies,
homosexuals, and the mentally retarded.22" ' However, Justice O'Connor offers
another explanation for the results in those cases. In Lawrence, she stated that in
each case, the government had sought to control the personal relationships of
individuals.222 In Cleburne, the city attempted to prevent the mentally retarded from
living in the community in a group home. 23 In Moreno, the federal law was
directed at communal living arrangements of "hippies." '224 And in Romer, the state
constitutional amendment implied disapproval of homosexual relationships.225
Where federal, state, and local officials seek to control the private living
arrangements of individuals, Justice O'Connor indicates that the proffered
justification of the law will be more closely examined.
The consequence of Justice O'Connor's adoption of "higher level rational
basis" in Lawrence and "lower level strict scrutiny" in Grutter is to call into
question the stability of the standards of review that have served the Court for over
half a century.226 Her reasoning in these cases is consistent with the position taken
218 Id. at 448.
219 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
220 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
221 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534; Cleburne, 473 U.S.
at 446-47; Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
222 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
223 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at455 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The record convinces me that this
permit was required because of the irrational fears of neighboring property owners, rather
than for the protection of the mentally retarded persons who would reside in [the] home.").
224 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 ('The legislative history ... indicates that that amendment
was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the
food stamp progran.").
225 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 ("We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals
not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.").
226 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (originating the
concept of "more exacting judicial scrutiny" for laws that infringe fundamental rights or
discriminate against minority groups).
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by Justice Stevens, who explained in his concurring opinion in Cleburne that he did
not recognize separate and distinct standards of review such as strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis in equal protection cases, but rather a
"continuum of judgmental responses" depending upon the legitimacy and the
neutrality of the reasons offered in support of the law.227 In her majority opinion in
Grutter and her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor essentially
adopts the same approach, in which the standard of review is adjusted according to
various factors such as whether or not the law intentionally stigmatizes people or
affects private living arrangements.2 '
D. Moral disapproval of a group or its actions standing alone is not a sufficient
reason for legislation that discriminates against the group.
As described above, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence holds that "moral
disapproval" of behavior is insufficient to justify a law under the Due Process
Clause.229 In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor extends that
principle to Equal Protection cases, holding that moral disapproval of a group or its
actions is insufficient to justify discriminatory legislation.23 °
227 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated:
[O]ur cases reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing
classifications which have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from
"strict scrutiny" at one extreme to "rational basis" at the other. I have never been
persuaded that these so-called "standards" adequately explain the decisional
process. Cases involving classifications based on alienage, illegal residency,
illegitimacy, gender, age, or - as in this case - mental retardation, do not fit
well into sharply defined classifications.
"I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the [tiered] analysis of
equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of
deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain
decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent
fashion." In my own approach to these cases, I have always asked myself
whether I could find a "rational basis" for the classification at issue. The term
"rational," of course, includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could
logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose
that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class. Thus, the
word "rational" - for me at least - includes elements of legitimacy and
neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty
to govern impartially.
Id. at 451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted)).
228 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337-38 (2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 123
S. Ct. 2472, 2485 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
229 See discussion supra Part I.D.
230 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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In Romer v. Evans,the Court ruled that the Colorado constitutional amendment
making it harder to adopt laws and ordinances eliminating acts of discrimination
against homosexuals was unconstitutional because it found that the amendment was
motivated by an illegitimate purpose: a "bare... desire to harm" homosexuals."'
Speaking for six Justices, Justice Kennedy stated:
[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected. "[Ilf the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the
laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest." 232
Justice Kennedy left no doubt on this point. Near the conclusion of his opinion, he
stated: "Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end
but to make them unequal to everyone else." '233
Justice Scalia opened his dissenting opinion in Romer with the remark, "The
Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite, '': " meaning that the Colorado
law was adopted because the people of Colorado disapproved of homosexual
conduct, not because they disliked homosexuals. Justice Scalia explained that there
is a difference between "moral disapproval" and "hatred":
The Court's opinion contains grim, disapproving hints that Coloradans
have been guilty of "animus" or "animosity" toward homosexuality, as
though that has been established as un-American. Of course it is our
moral heritage that one should not hate any human being or class of
human beings. But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct
reprehensible - murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to
animals - and could exhibit even "animus" toward such conduct. Surely
that is the only sort of "animus" at issue here: moral disapproval of
homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced
the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.233
231 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
232 Id. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
233 Id. at 635.
23 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia added that for the Court to suggest that
the Colorado law was motivated by nothing more than a bare desire to harm homosexuals "is
nothing short of insulting." Id. at 652.
[Vol. 12:65
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL REVOLUTION
Justice Scalia is certainly correct in stating that there is a difference between
moral disapproval of someone's conduct and personal animosity towards that
person. However, this does not answer the argument that moral disapproval, in and
of itself, is insufficient to justify prohibitory legislation. In Lawrence, Justice
O'Connor expressly rejects the legal distinction that Justice Scalia drew between
"moral disapproval" and "malice." Instead, she concludes that moral disapproval,
standing alone, is the legal equivalent of a bare desire to harm. In her separate
concurring opinion she stated, "Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire
to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause." '236 This is, of course, consonant with the
reasoning of the majority in Lawrence that moral disapproval is insufficient to
satisfy rational basis review under the Due Process Clause. 37
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor argued in Lawrence that moral disapproval of
homosexual behavior is "closely correlated" with attitudes towards homosexuals:
"While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this
law is conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual." '238 Given the
difficulties in prosecuting homosexual behavior, the law partakes more of a
statement of opinion rather than a criminal prohibition: "[A]s applied to private,
consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval
against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior." '239 In the conclusion
to her opinion, she reiterated that "moral disapproval" of a class of persons and the
conduct associated with that class was inadequate to justify a criminal statute under
the Constitution:
A law branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the
State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with
that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause, under any standard of review. I therefore concur in
the Court's judgment that Texas' sodomy law banning "deviate sexual
intercourse" between consenting adults of the same sex, but not between
consenting adults of different sexes, is unconstitutional. 240
Justice Scalia is absolutely right in distinguishing animosity towards persons
from disapproval of their conduct; however, he is wrong in thinking that laws
justified only by morality are constitutional. According to Scalia, hatred, animosity,
or "a bare... desire to harm" a group of people is an illegitimate purpose, while
236 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231 See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
238 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
239 Id.
240 Id. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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moral disapproval of conduct is a legitimate governmental motivation. However,
moral disapproval, standing alone, is insufficient to justify a law.24 ' In order to
successfully support the constitutionality of a prohibitory or discriminatory law, it
is incumbent upon the majority to demonstrate why it disapproves of the
individual's or the group's behavior.
E. Affirmative action in university admissions is necessary to train leaders from
all segments of society.
There are two very surprising aspects of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter
v. Bollinger.242 The first surprise is that Justice O'Connor recognized any
nonremedial purpose as "compelling." '243 The second surprise is the strong
emphasis that she placed on the impact of diversity in higher education for society
in general, as opposed to its importance within the university."' These holdings are
surprising because they contradict what she had written in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.
245
At issue in Croson was the constitutionality of a city's affirmative action
program that required prime contractors who were awarded contracts with the city
to set aside thirty percent of the dollar amount of the subcontracts for minority
business enterprises.246 In the course of her opinion for the plurality in Croson,
Justice O'Connor stated that only "remedial" purposes could justify a system of
race-based preferences.247 She said: "Classifications based on race carry a danger
of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may
in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility."24
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor reversed her position and held that race-based
affirmative action may be justified by nonremedial purposes.249 She implied that
241 Id. at 2486.
242 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
243 Id. at 2338-39.
244 Id. at 2340-41.
245 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down the city's affirmative action program for minority
business enterprises).
246 Id. at 477-78 (describing municipal set-aside program).
247 Id. at 509-10 (discussing permissible justifications for racial classifications).
248 Id.
249 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-39. Justice O'Connor stated:
It is true that some language in those opinions might be read to suggest that
remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-based
governmental action. [citing her opinion in Croson] But we have never held that
the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying
past discrimination. Nor, since Bakke, have we directly addressed the use of race
in the context of public higher education. Today, we hold that the Law School
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her statement in Croson to the contrary was mere obiter dictum and stated that, in
any event, the Court had not addressed the constitutionality of affirmative action in
higher education since the Bakke case.25 She ruled that "the Law School has a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.
' 25
'
The second surprising aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter was the
rationale offered in support of diversity in higher education. In Bakke, the principal
justification that Justice Powell recognized in support of race-based affirmative
action for admission to medical school in university admissions was to protect the
university's First Amendment right to create a diverse learning environment for its
students, which would, in the opinion of the university, improve the educational
experience on campus and in the classroom, and better prepare students for
leadership roles in our diverse society.252 In Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized
those interests as valid but also identified another: the need to recruit and train
effective leaders from all quarters of society.253
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor identified three overlapping goals that public
universities are attempting to achieve by employing race-based admissions
programs. First, affirmative action is intended to improve students' educational
experience, both on campus and in the classroom. 54 Diversity promotes "cross-
racial understanding" and makes classroom discussion "livelier, more spirited, and
... more enlightening and interesting." '255 Second, the university seeks to prepare
has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.
Id.
250 See id.
251 Id. at 2339.
252 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978). Justice Powell
stated:
The atmosphere of "speculation, experiment and creation" - so essential to the
quality of higher education - is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse
student body. As the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that the
"nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure" to the
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select those
students who will contribute the most to the "robust exchange of ideas,"
petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First
Amendment. In this light, petitioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal
that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
23 See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text (discussing the goals articulated by
Justice O'Connor for the use of affirmative action in university admissions).
' Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003).
255 Id. at 2340. Justice O'Connor stated:
These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law
School's admissions policy promotes "cross-racial understanding," helps to
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students to live and work in a diverse society.256 Living and studying with people
in a diverse environment helps to prepare students to perform in an "increasingly
diverse workforce. 22 7 And third, since universities "represent the training ground
for a large number of our Nation's leaders," they must offer advanced education and
training to a diverse student body in order to cultivate leaders from all segments of
society.
211
The first two goals mentioned above were the principal focus of Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke.259 However, the third argument listed above is, in my
opinion, the most passionate portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion, and it is the
most persuasive argument in favor of affirmative action. Justice O'Connor stated:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this
training. As we have recognized, law schools "cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts." Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession)
must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and
education necessary to succeed in America."t
This passage indicates that affirmative action in university admissions is
constitutional not solely because it improves the educational experience of students
break down racial stereotypes, and "enables [students] to better understand
persons of different races." App. to Pet. for Cert. 246a. These benefits are
"important and laudable," because "classroom discussion is livelier, more
spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting" when the students have
"the greatest possible variety of backgrounds."
Id. at 2339-40 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).
256 Id. at 2340.
" Id. ("In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial,
numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them
as professionals."').
258 Id. at 2341 ("In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity.").
259 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312-13 (1978).
260 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1949))
(citation omitted).
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and certainly not because it is remedial. Instead, affirmative action is constitutional
because it is vital to the future of our nation. The path to leadership must be open
to all races and ethnicities because our leaders must be drawn from and responsive
to all segments of society. Justice O'Connor repeatedly cited and quoted amicus
briefs submitted by respected public figures and institutions contending that
affirmative action at leading educational institutions is necessary for training our
nation's leaders in politics,26 ' industry,262 and the military.263
This constitutes a fundamental change in the Court's analysis of race-based
preferences. Justice O'Connor's rationale far surpasses that of Justice Powell in
both scope and breadth of the reasons that may be offered in support of affirmative
action, and potentially opens the door to recognizing other sociological arguments
supporting interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause. Grutter recognizes the
pluralistic nature of our country, and it gives our public officials and educators the
power to open the doors of higher education to future leaders of all races.
I' id. at 2341. Justice O'Connor stated:
Individuals with law degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more
than half the seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats
in the United States House of Representatives .... The pattern is even more
striking when it comes to highly selective law schools. A handful of these
schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States
Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States
District Court judges.
lI (citations omitted).
262 Id. at 2340 ("[M]ajor American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in
today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.").
263 Id. Justice O'Connor stated:
[H]igh-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military
assert that, "based on [their] decades of experience," a "highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle
mission to provide national security ... " The primary sources for the Nation's
officer corps are the service academies and the Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC), the latter comprising students already admitted to participating colleges
and universities .... At present, "the military cannot achieve an officer corps that
is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies and the
ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies.... To
fulfill its mission, the military "must be selective in admissions for training and
education for the officer corps, and it must train and educate a highly qualified,
racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse setting...." We agree that "it
requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our country's other
most selective institutions must remain both diverse and selective."
Id. (citations omitted).
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I. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudential and doctrinal changes announced in Lawrence and Grutter
amount to a revolution in the Court's approach to defining our fundamental rights
of liberty and equality. In determining the constitutionality of laws, the Court will
not confine itself to inquiring whether these laws are consistent with the specific
traditions of our ancestors, but rather it will carefully evaluate the effects of these
laws on our lives and on our society. In making these determinations, the Court will
also look to the experiences and beliefs of other nations that are committed to
freedom. Popular notions of morality, standing alone, are insufficient to support
prohibitory or discriminatory legislation. Standards of review such as strict scrutiny
and rational basis are not static but are sensitive to context. Laws that intentionally
stigmatize people or that interfere with personal relationships are scrutinized more
strictly than laws that do not. Similarly, narrowly-tailored racial distinctions that
are designed not to stigmatize but to more fully integrate our society may be upheld.
In Lawrence and Grutter, the Supreme Court rejected tradition and embraced
a consequentialist approach to defining our fundamental rights to liberty and
equality. In doing so, the Court has undertaken a monumental task. In Lawrence
and Grutter, the Supreme Court assumed responsibility for determining the extent
to which people have the capacity to love and the capability for leadership. It is a
jurisprudence that promises to unlock human potential by removing purposeless
restraints and by allowing public officials to dismantle historical barriers to
advancement.
The decision of the Supreme Court to cut loose from tradition and embark upon
a voyage of discovering human potential is itself a peculiarly American decision.
We are, as John F. Kennedy said, "a nation of immigrants. ' 26 Our forefathers and
foremothers left their villages and their families, their familiar customs and their
language, to come to our "sea-washed, sunset ''265 shores in search of opportunity
and freedom. Our ancestors' hopes and dreams were shaped by the frontier,2 66 and
even today, Americans travel and relocate freely within this continental nation.
The founders of our nation would not have approved of an approach to
interpreting the Constitution that confined itself to "particular, identifiable
264 JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1964).
265 EMMA LAZARUS, The New Colossus, 1 in THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARuS 2 (1889)
available at http://etext.virginia.edu ("Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand / A
mighty woman with a torch, whose flame / Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name I
Mother of Exiles.").
266 See PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THECIVILWAR 99-100 (1965) (describing the importance of James Fennimore Cooper's The
Leatherstocking Tales, in shaping American attitudes towards law); see generally FREDERICK
JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1967) (discussing the significance
of the advancing of frontier settlement in American History).
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traditions."267 The Framers did not consider themselves bound to familiar patterns
of society. The men who pledged "our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor"26
to each other during the War of Independence were not afraid of change.
Nor would the Framers have been surprised by the thought that Americans have
fundamental rights that are not enumerated in the Constitution. This is, after all, the
point of the Ninth Amendment.269 Here is what Alexander Hamilton thought about
the source of our fundamental rights: "the sacred rights of mankind are not to be
rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written as with
a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of Divinity itself and
can never be erased or obscured by mortal power."27
Furthermore, Americans have long known that "equality" is an evolving
concept. Abraham Lincoln understood that the idea of "equality" is not a static
notion, but rather imposes upon us a continuing obligation. In the debates with
Stephen Douglas, Lincoln said that when the Framers wrote the phrase "all men are
created equal" in 1787 it was an "obvious untruth" as to the then-existing state of
affairs,27' but:
They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be
familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly
labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly
approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its
influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people
of all colors everywhere.272
Like the phrase "all men are created equal," the Equal Protection Clause is also
an evolving concept because a state of perfect equality did not exist among us in
267 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6; See supra notes 26-31 and
accompanying text.
268 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
269 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
270 Douglas W. Kmiec, America's "Culture War" - The Sinister Denial of Virtue and the
Decline of Natural Law, 13 ST. LOuIS U. PUB. L. REv. 183, 188 (1993) (quoting Manion,
Philosophy of Founding Fathers, in 1 UNPV. OF NOTRE DAME NAT'L LAW INST.
PROCEEDINGS 23-24 (Alfred L. Scanlan ed., 1947) (quoting Hamilton's defense of the
legality of the Continental Congress)); see also Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment
Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy
Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 108-09 (2000) (describing the Framers' beliefs in the Lockean
theory of natural rights).
27 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 398, 406 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
272 Id.
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1868 when the Equal Protection Clause was adopted. As Professor Cass Sunstein
noted:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not rooted in common law or status quo
baselines, or in Anglo-American conventions. The baseline is instead a
principle of equality that operates as a criticism of existing practice. The
clause does not safeguard traditions; it protects against traditions,
however long-standing and deeply rooted.273
Finally, the consequentialist approach that is embraced by the Court in
Lawrence and Grutter is a reflection of the American spirit. The quintessential
American philosophy is "pragmatism," a consequentialist approach to solving
social, moral, and legal problems. It was developed by the Americans Charles
Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey, and it was incorporated into our
law by the Americans Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo,
and Learned Hand.274 As Cardozo said:
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its
aim cannot permanently justify its existence .... Logic and history and
custom have their place. We will shape the law to conform to them
when we may; but only within bounds. The end which the law serves
will dominate them all.275
The end that the Constitution serves is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity." '276 To accomplish this goal, it is necessary for the
Supreme Court to be sensitive to "how people do live," as Professor Lynn
Henderson said.277 The inescapable truth is that homosexual relationships are
273 Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1174 (1988).
274 See generally WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 13-68 (2002)
(discussing how legal arguments arise and how they are used as rules of law in society).
275 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921).
276 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
277 Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1575 (1987).
Professor Henderson opened this influential article with a quotation from Thurgood Marshall:
"It is perfectly properfor judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires. But it is
disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded
assumptions about how people live." Id. at 1574 (quoting United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). In Kras, Marshall presented the following
consequentialist analysis:
It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of less than $2 are
no burden. But no one who has had close contact with poor people can fail to
understand how close to the margin of survival many of them are. A sudden
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valuable and deserving of respect and that members of previously subjugated
minority groups will assume positions of leadership tomorrow only if they attend
our nation's universities and graduate schools today. The Supreme Court is to be
commended for acknowledging these facts and for interpreting the Constitution
accordingly.
illness, for example, may destroy whatever savings they may have accumulated,
and by eliminating a sense of security may destroy the incentive to save in the
future. A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a routine purchase but
a luxury indulged in only rarely. The desperately poor almost never go to see a
movie, which the majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity. They
have more important things to do with what little money they have - like
attempting to provide some comforts for a gravely ill child, as Kras must do.
Kras, 409 U.S. at 406 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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